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PREFACE
In response to the request of His Excellency, Theodore
Francis Green, Governor of the State of Rhode Island and
Providence Plantations, the advisory opinion of the Supreme
Court was rendered April 1, 1935, upon questions relating
to a constitutional convention.
The opinion of the Supreme Court together with the affirmative and negative briefs, prepared by distinguished members
of the Rhode Island Bar, submitted to the Supreme Court
upon these questions, are herein reprinted in documentary
form for f u t u r e reference in response to the widespread demand and because they are important historical contributions to the annals of this state, deservedly meriting preservation.
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ADVISORY OPINION
OF T H E

Supreme Court of Rhode Island
UPON

Q U E S T I O N S R E L A T I N G TO A

Constitutional Convention
APRIL 1, 1935
To His Excellency, Theodore Francis Green, Governor of
the State of Rhode Island and Providence
Plantations:
We have received from Your Excellency a request for our
written opinion upon a question of law in accordance with
the following section of article X I I of amendments to the
constitution of this state: "Sec. 2. The judges of the supreme
court shall give their written opinion upon any question of
law whenever requested by the governor or by either house
of the general assembly": The question is as follows:
"Would it be a valid exercise of the legislative power if
the General Assembly should provide by law,
(a) for a convention to be called to revise or amend the
constitution of the state;
(b) that the governor shall call for the election, at a
date to be fixed by him, of delegates to such convention in such number and manner as the General
Assembly shall determine;
(c) that the general officers of the state shall by virtue
of their offices be members of such convention;
(d) for the organization and conduct of such convention;
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(e) for the submission to the people, for their ratification and adoption, of any constitution or amendments proposed by such convention; and
(f) for declaring the result and effect of the vote of a
majority of the electors voting upon the question of
such ratification and adoption?"
If this language were strictly and literally construed, it
would require us to give a negative answer to the question,
unless we should be of the opinion that it would be a valid
exercise of its legislative power for the general assembly to
pass an act or resolution which would contain provisions for
all the different matters which are set forth in sub-paragraphs (a) to (f), inclusive, of the question. For obvious
reasons we do not believe that the question was intended to
be so construed.
Therefore, to carry out what we believe to be the real intent and purpose of the question, we construe it as comprising six questions, the first of which is whether it would be a
valid exercise of the power of the general assembly, if it
should provide, by an act or resolution, for the calling of a
convention to revise or amend the constitution of the state.
All of the other questions are only subsidiary and have no
meaning, unless this first and primary question is answered
in the affirmative. Assuming that it is so answered, each of
the other questions is whether such an act or resolution of
the general assembly could legally contain such a provision
as is set forth in (b), (c), (d), (e), or (f) as the case may
be.
These questions raise an issue that has long troubled the
people of our state. That issue simply put is whether Article X I I I of our constitution prescribes an exclusive method
of altering the constitution either in part or as a whole. If
it does, then a legal constitutional convention is an impossibility in Rhode Island. The judges of this court in an opinion
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submitted to the Honorable Senate forty-two years ago, In
Re The Constitutional Convention, 14 R. I. 649, (March 30,
1883), said that it did. Since t h a t time there has been no
f u r t h e r judicial expression on the point in this state. Almost
from the day it was given, however, that opinion has been
subjected to vigorous attack by authorities on the law of constitutional conventions both within and without the state. No
court anywhere in the country when called upon to consider
a similar constitutional question has cited it for authority.
In view of the foregoing, we have deemed it of the utmost
importance in our consideration of the questions before us
to exhaust every avenue of information t h a t would assist us
in giving our opinion. Accordingly we have largely laid aside
other duties pressing upon us and have devoted ourselves to
a thorough, painstaking examination of the authorities and
a careful review of the legislative precedents and practice of
Rhode Island in the field of constitution-making. In this
we have been ably assisted by outstanding leaders of our bar,
including the attorney general of the state, who at our invitation appeared before us and argued these intricate constitutional questions. In addition we have had also the benefit
of their well-prepared and exhaustive briefs in the matter.
We have carefully considered all the arguments presented
and have examined and carefully considered all of the authorities to which our attention has been called and many
others.
The first and primary question to be considered, then, is
whether it would be a valid exercise of the power of the general assembly, if it should provide by law for the calling of a
constitutional convention to revise or amend the constitution
of the state. In dealing with this question, consideration
should be given first to the pertinent parts of our constitution.
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ARTICLE I .

Declaration of Certain Constitutional

Rights and

Principles.

In order effectually to secure the religious and political
freedom established by our venerated ancestors, and to preserve the same for our posterity, we do declare that the essential and unquestionable rights and principles hereafter mentioned shall be established, maintained, and preserved, and
shall be of paramount obligation in all legislative, judicial,
and executive proceedings.
Section 1. In the words of the Father of his Country, we
declare that "the basis of our political systems is the right
of the people to make and alter their constitutions of government ; but that the constitution which at any time exists, till
changed by an explicit and authentic act of the whole people,
is sacredly obligatory upon all."
ARTICLE I V .

Of the Legislative Power.
Section 1. This constitution shall be the supreme law of
the state, and any law inconsistent therewith shall be void.
The general assembly shall pass all laws necessary to carry
this constitution into effect.
Sec. 10. The general assembly shall continue to exercise
the powers they have heretofore exercised, unless prohibited
in this constitution.
ARTICLE

XIII.

Of Amendments.
The general assembly may propose amendments to this
constitution by the votes of a majority of all the members
elected to each house. Such propositions for amendment shall
be published in the newspapers, and printed copies of them
shall be sent by the secretary of state, with the names of all
the members who shall have voted thereon, with the yeas and
nays, to all the town and city clerks in the state. The said
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propositions shall be, by said clerks, inserted in the warrants
or notices by them issued, for warning the next annual town
and ward meetings in April; and the clerks shall read said
propositions to the electors when thus assembled, with the
names of all the representatives and senators who shall have
voted thereon, with the yeas and nays, before the election of
senators and representatives shall be had. If a majority of
all the members elected to each house, at said annual meeting, shall approve any proposition thus made, the same shall
be published and submitted to the electors in the mode provided in the act of approval; and if then approved by threefifths of the electors of the state present and voting thereon
in town and ward meetings, it shall become a p a r t of the constitution of the state.
The constitution contains no mention of a constitutional
convention or of any method of constitutional change except
as above set forth. The title given in the constitution to Article I, namely, "Declaration of Certain Constitutional
Rights and Principles", shows that the right which is set
forth in the first section is a constitutional and not a revolutionary right. I t states in substance and effect that one of
the fundamental rights, which, as the preamble of this article
says, "shall be established, maintained, and preserved, and
shall be of paramount obligation in all legislative, judicial,
and executive proceedings", is the right of the people "to
make and alter their constitutions of government" by any
"explicit and authentic act of the whole people." It is a recognized principle of free institutions that the normal and
regular way for the people to act on any matter submitted
to them, unless some other way is clearly and validly prescribed, is by the votes of a majority of the duly qualified
electors who vote on such matters, such votes then constituting an "act of the whole people."
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According to the language of the section in question such
an act, to have the effect of making or altering a constitution must be "an explicit and authentic act", that is, it must
be clearly and definitely expressed by votes which are cast
and counted and the result of which is determined, all according to law. The second sentence of section 1 of Article
IV, above quoted is "The general assembly shall pass all laws
necessary to carry this constitution into effect." Taken alone
this might reasonably mean that the general assembly shall
pass all laws necessary to put the constitution into operation
and to provide for the transition from government under the
charter to government under the constitution. But these
matters are well provided for by the constitution itself in
section 1 of Article XIV, which provides when the constitution shall go into operation, if adopted, and how the first
elections under it shall be held and for the transition from
the old government to the new.
If the sentence in question were intended to apply only to
the transition period, it would naturally be placed in Article XIV, which deals with that subject. Instead of being
so placed, it follows immediately after the sentence "This
constitution shall be the supreme law of the state, and any
law inconsistent therewith shall be void." This evidently
applies to the whole period during which the constitution
shall be in operation and says that the general assembly cannot validly pass any laws which are inconsistent with the
constitution. The most natural conclusion is that the sentence
which follows, namely, "The general assembly shall pass all
laws necessary to carry this constitution into effect" was intended to cover the same period and to make it the duty of
the general assembly, not only to refrain from passing anv
law which is contrary to the constitution, as provided in the
first sentence, but also to pass all laws which shall be necessary from time to time to make effective at all times the
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provisions of the constitution, including those in Article I,
the "Bill of Rights." F o r these reasons it is our opinion after
careful consideration t h a t it is the duty of the general assembly to pass whatever laws may be needed, at any time or
from time to time, to enable the people by an explicit and authentic act to make a new constitution or to alter the present one.
The method of doing this, which had been recognized as
the regular and ordinary method and which had been used
before 1843 by many states, when there was no provision for
it in their constitutions, was first, by the holding of a convention under a legislative enactment, second, by the framing of a new constitution or the revision of the existing one
and third, by the adoption of such new constitution or revision by the people at an election provided for by law. It is
also well settled that no other method can be legally employed for amending or revising a constitution or substituting another one for it, unless such other method is expressly
provided for in the constitution itself.
The above procedure has also been followed a great many
times since 1842 in most of our states, without any provisions for it in the constitutions which were in effect in those
states when the conventions were called. Changes thus made
have always been recognized as regular and legal and not
revolutionary by all the text writers on the subject of constitutional law and by all the courts which have dealt with such
changes, leaving out of consideration for the present two advisory opinions, Opinion of the Justices, 6 Cush. 573, and
In Re The Constitutional
Convention, supra, which will be
fully discussed later in this opinion.
The regularity and legality of this method, in the absence
of any provision for it in a constitution, has perhaps never
been better stated than by Daniel Webster in his argument
before the supreme court of the United States in the Rhode
Island case of Luther vs. Borden, 7 How. 1, (1848).
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The following quotations from this argument are found in
"Works of Daniel Webster", VI, 227-229. After speaking of
the established American doctrine of popular sovereignty he
said: "Another American principle growing out of this, and
just as important and well settled as is the truth t h a t the
people are the source of power, is that, when in the course
of events it becomes necessary to ascertain the will of the
people on a new exigency, or a new state of things or of
opinion, the legislative power provides for that ascertainment by an ordinary act of legislation. * * * It is enough
to say that, of the old thirteen states, the constitutions, with
but one exception, contained no provision for their own
amendment. * * * Yet there is hardly one that has not
altered its Constitution, and it has been done by conventions
called by the legislature, as an ordinary exercise of legislative power.
"One of the most recent laws for taking the will of the
people in any State is the law of 1845, of the State of New
York. It begins by recommending to the people to assemble
in their several election districts, and proceed to vote for delegates to a convention. If you will take the pains to read
that act, it will be seen that New York regarded it as an ordinary exercise of legislative power. * * * We see, therefore, from the commencement of the government under which
we live, down to this late Act of the State of New York, one
uniform current of law, of precedent, and of practice, all going to establish the point that changes in government are to
be brought about by the will of the people, assembled under
such legislative provisions as may be necessary to ascertain
that will, truly and authentically."
The 1821 constitution of New York, in effect when this act
was passed, contained no provision for calling a constitutional convention and no declaration of popular rights on
the subject and did contain a provision (Art. 8) for its
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amendment by legislative proposal, in substantially the same
way as provided in the constitution of Rhode Island.
Before 1842 there had been for more than twenty years
great agitation and discussion of the matter of the framing
and adopting of a constitution, and the general assembly had
responded by calling conventions for the purpose in 1824,
1834, 1841 and 1842, the last one of which framed our present constitution adopted in 1842. When the convention placed
in that constitution the statement that the people of Rhode
Island had an unquestionable right to make and alter their
constitution, it had in mind the manner in which this first
constitution was made and it intended to reserve t h a t right
to the people for all time. This was the construction placed
upon this language by the general assembly eleven years later
in 1853, when they invited the people to elect delegates to a
convention. There was no question raised at that time of the
right of the people to do so upon such invitation. All these
events must be considered in construing the provisions of
the present constitution which are pertinent to the question
now under discussion.
The next of these provisions now to be discussed is the
above quoted section 10 of Article IV, "The general assembly
shall continue to exercise the powers they have heretofore
exercised, unless prohibited in this constitution." I t is our
opinion, in view of these legislative precedents up to and
including 1842, that under this language the general assembly, unless prohibited elsewhere in the constitution, has the
constitutional power to pass a law providing for the calling
and holding of a convention to revise the existing constitution or to f r a m e a new one.
Can we say that this otherwise clear and undoubted power
in our general assembly, which it had so frequently exercised under the charter, is non-existent because the exercise
of it is elsewhere prohibited in the constitution? The word

16
"prohibited" is a strong word and in our judgment is not
satisfied by anything short of a prohibition that is clearly,
definitely and necessarily implied, even if it does not require
that the prohibition be express. Moreover, these facts, above
stated, should be kept in mind, that section 1 of Article I of
the constitution states the fundamental right of the people
"to make and alter their constitutions of government", with
the sole limitation that this must be done "by an explicit and
authentic act of the whole people"; that the normal, regular,
and legal method of exercising that right, unless excluded by
the constitution, has always been held, in all states and by
all authorities, to be by the action of a convention chosen
by the electors and the approval of that action by the votes
of a majority of the electors who vote thereon, all under a
law or laws passed by the legislature; that the right of the
people "to make and alter their constitutions of government
* * # by an explicit and authentic act" is one of the rights
which by the preamble to Article I "shall be established,
maintained, and preserved, and shall be of paramount obligation in all legislative, judicial, and executive proceedings";
and that by section 2 of Article IV it is the duty of the general assembly to pass all laws necessary to make this right
effective.
These facts strongly support our conclusion that the exercise by our general assembly of its previously exercised right
to provide by law for calling a constitutional convention cannot properly be held to be prohibited by anything short of
a prohibition that is clearly, definitely and necessarily implied, so as to be substantially equivalent to an express prohibition.
There is in our constitution no express prohibition of the
exercise by the general assembly of a power to provide for
a constitutional convention, and the only p a r t of it which
has ever been relied upon as impliedly prohibiting the exer-
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cise of such a power is Article X I I I , above quoted, which
provides that the general assembly may propose amendments
to this constitution by following a certain required procedure
and that such proposals, thus made, may be ratified by threefifths of the electors voting thereon. One power which a
legislature has cannot properly be held to be impliedly prohibited by the grant to it of another power, unless the two
powers are inconsistent with each other. There is no inconsistency whatever between the power of a legislature to provide for calling a convention, to be chosen by the people, for
revising a constitution or drafting a new one, and to provide
that a revision or new constitution so made shall be submitted to the people and become operative, if adopted by a majority vote, and another power in the legislature, by following a prescribed procedure, to propose directly to the people
an amendment or amendments of the existing constitution.
The two powers are suitable for different purposes, the
former to a general revision of a constitution or the making
of a new one, the latter to the making of a special and particular amendment or a few of them, where the matter is
relatively simple. That they are not inconsistent is shown
by the fact that very frequently both powers have been provided for in the same constitution. With both powers the
main sanction is the vote of the people, but with the former
the matter voted on by the people is framed by a convention,
the members of which are specially chosen by the people for
t h a t purpose only and assigned to that one task, and the
only function of the general assembly is to provide for this
to be done; with the latter the matter voted on by the people
is framed by the general assembly whose chief function is to
perform general legislative duties. F o r these reasons we
are convinced t h a t the exercise of the former power by the
general assembly is not prohibited by Article X I I I , which
merely permits and regulates the exercise of the latter power.
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Yet the judges of this court in 1883 in their opinion entitled In Re The Constitutional Convention, supra, advised
the senate that the exercise of any power by the general assembly to make any provision by law with regard to a constitutional convention was impliedly prohibited by Article
XIII, which in their judgment was an exclusive provision for
amending the constitution; that "the mode provided in the
constitution for the amendment thereof is the only mode in
which it can be constitutionally amended."
We do not feel bound to follow that opinion. While it is
entitled to respect, and we have given it careful attention, it
is not a decision of this court and therefore can have no
weight as a precedent.
In the litigated case of Taylor vs. Place, 4 R. I. 324, a t
page 362, (1856), Ames, C. J . said: "The advice, or opinion,
given * * * to the governor, or to either house of the assembly, under the third section of the tenth article of the
constitution, is not a decision of this court; and given as it
must be, without the aid which the court derives, in adversary cases, from able and experienced counsel, though it may
afford much light, from the reasonings or research displayed
in it, can have no weight as a precedent." This court has
since uniformly so regarded its advisory opinions. Allen vs.
Danielson, 15 R. I. 480, (1887) ; In Re Election of United
States Senators, 41 R. I. 211, (1918) ; Opinion to the Senate,
51 R. I. 322, (1931).
In applying this rule stated by Ames, C. J., supra, to the
above mentioned opinion in 14 R. I., it should first be noticed that the opinion itself shows that the resolution of the
senate for submitting the questions to the judges was adopted
March 20, 1883, and was received by them on March 24, and
that their opinion was delivered six days later. Evidently
they had no assistance from counsel. The last sentence of
the opinion is as follows: "The questions are extremely im-
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portant, and we should have been glad of an opportunity to
give them a more careful study, but under the request of the
Senate for our opinion, 'without any unnecessary delay', we
have thought it to be our duty to return our opinion as soon
as we could, without neglecting other duties, prepare it."
In a pamphlet entitled "Some Thoughts on the Constitution of Rhode Island" and published in 1884, Durfee, C. J.,
one of the judges, said that during the six days they "were
holding court all the while" and that the question was not
novel to him. though he "had not given it any special study."
The whole opinion indicates t h a t it was ill-considered and
hastily prepared. It is not only not binding on us as a precedent, but is also entitled to little or no weight, in spite of the
ability and character of the men who joined in it.
For the conclusion arrived at by the judges, viz., "that the
mode provided in the constitution for the amendment thereof is the only mode in which it can be constitutionally
amended," the only reason of a legal nature given in the
opinion is that the maxim "expressio unius est exclusio alterius" requires this conclusion. The opinion must stand or
fall according as that reason is sound or unsound. In the
first place, we are convinced that the judges misunderstood
the maxim and its proper application. It does not mean,
where two powers are not inconsistent, that the granting or
affirmance of one of them is a prohibition of the exercise of
the other.
We agree fully with what the New York court of appeals
said in Barto vs. Himrod, 8 N. Y. 483, at 493, in which the
question was whether the legislature could enact a law subject to the approval of a popular vote. "And I do not mean
to lay much stress upon the implication arising from the
express provision to submit a law creating a debt to the people, and the silence of the constitution in relation to submitting to the people other matters of legislation. The maxim
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'Expressiounius est exclusio alterius' is more applicable to
deeds and contracts than to a constitution, and requires great
caution in its application, in all cases."
The question now under consideration relates even more
to the fundamental right of the sovereign people to alter
their constitution than to the power of the general assembly
and we agree fully with what Judge Bradley, a former chief
justice of this court, at page 26 of the pamphlet published
by him entitled "The Methods of Changing the Constitution
of the States, especially that of Rhode Island", (1885), said
with reference to this maxim: "Any legislation which is to
affect the sovereign power should not leave the right to mere
inference. It should be direct, especially in constitutions
addressed to the popular mind and adopted by i t ; a great
sovereign right should not be left to legal conjecture and implication. The people, in such proceedings, say what they
mean. They do not leave a negation of one power to be inferred from the grant of another." Dwarris on Statutes, 712.
All the pertinent provisions of our constitution should be
considered in deciding the question whether the previously
exercised power of the general assembly to call a constitutional convention is prohibited by Article X I I I . The proper
reasoning to be applied to that question and the proper answer to it cannot in our judgment be better stated than they
were at page 30 of that pamphlet, where, a f t e r stating the
declarations in the preamble and Section 1 of Article I of
the constitution, Judge Bradley said of the right to hold a
convention: "This provision of our constitution is conclusive
as to the existence of the right. It is not referred to in these
denials of the right. There is another provision of the constitution which grants the power in question. Under the
charter government, the General Assembly possessed all
powers. Many of the people of the State preferred this patriarchal government to the division of powers systematical-
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ly arranged in the usual State constitution. They yielded
reluctantly to the pressure and persuasion of enemies and
friends. While granting a constitution, they yet incorporate
in it the provision that the General Assembly shall continue
to exercise the powers they have hitherto exercised unless
prohibited by the constitution. Among those powers was
that of calling a constitutional convention. Had they meant
to have excluded that power, they would have done so. The
mere permission to the Assembly to propose amendments
does not prohibit the other power. * * * I t certainly cannot be claimed that the amendatory power given to the General Assembly cannot operate or exist while the reforming
power over their constitution by the people, through a convention and act of Assembly, also exists. The coexistence
of these powers has been manifested in terms and in action
under nearly fifty State constitutions in this country."
The judges of this court in their advisory opinion on this
question say that "as was clearly shown in Taylor vs. Place,
supra, an implied is as effectual as an express prohibition."
But what was decided in that case, in the famous opinion by
Ames, C. J., was that the exercise by the general assembly of
the judicial power previously exercised by it is prohibited by
section 1 of Article X of the constitution, "The judicial power
of this state shall be vested in one supreme court, and in
such inferior courts as the general assembly may, from time
to time ordain and establish." The court properly held (pp.
355-359) that this is equivalent to saying that all the judicial
power of the state shall be so vested and gives exclusive
judicial power to the courts, and that this necessarily excludes the existence of judicial power in any other department of the government. The court says on page 359 that
"the implication is unavoidable and equivalent to an express
and explicit prohibition."
The judges, near the beginning of the advisory opinion say,

"The ordinary rule is that whore power is given to do a
thing in a particular way. there the affirmative words, marking out the particular way, prohibit all other ways by implication, so that the particular way is the only way in
which the power can be legally exercised." This way of
slating the rule does not show its limitations or its true basis,
which in that affirmative words may properly be construed
8h operating negatively also, if, unless they are so construed,
they will have no effective operation at all. The limitations
and true basis of the rule are well brought out in North Stafford Steel dc. Co. vs. Ward, L. R. 3 Exch. 173, (1868), one of
the four authorities cited by our judges in support of their
statementof the rule. There the articles of association of a
company provided that in case all its shares of stock were
not subscribed for, it could, if the directors should by resolution HO declare, carry on its business as a company from that
time just as if its shares were all subscribed for. It was held
that the company could not begin doing business until either
its shares were all subscribed for or such resolution had been
parted. The court properly said that unless the language was
construed as having that effect it was meaningless. Neither
this nor any of the other three authorities cited by our judges
as supporting the rule as they state it seems to us to give any
support to their application of such rule.
The rule has been properly applied in cases to be discussed
infra, which have held that if a legislature is given by a constitution the power to propose directly to the people amendments to the constitution, and the method of doing this is
stated, that power cannot be legally exercised by any other
method. What our judges did was to conclude in effect that,
under the rule which they stated, the grant of power to the
general assembly by Article XIII to frame and propose
amendments, by a certain method, prohibited the general assembly from exercising a power which it had independently
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of that grant and which was a different but not an inconsistent power, namely, the power to provide by law for the calling of a convention to frame a new constitution or a revision
of the existing one and propose it to the people for adoption
or rejection. We believe that no support can be found for
that conclusion.
The power granted to the general assembly by Article X I I I
can naturally and reasonably be viewed as an
additional
rather than an exclusive power and the recognized rule is that
if two constructions of a constitutional provision are reasonably possible, one of which would diminish or restrict a fundamental right of the people and the other of which would
not do so, the latter must be adopted. Yet our judges, by a
highly technical course of reasoning, reached the conclusion
t h a t the people, by adopting a provision which permitted the
general assembly to propose amendments to them directly
in a specified manner, had divested themselves completely of
their fundamental right to revise their constitution or to
make a new one by the regular and normal method of a convention, chosen by themselves for t h a t purpose; and that this
was so because they had thus impliedly prohibited the general assembly from passing the measures necessary for the
legal exercise of t h a t right.
Our judges in their opinion said: "One of the greatest of
modern jurists, Chief Justice Shaw, was of the same way of
thinking, and conjointly with his associates, declared it to be
his opinion that the Constitution of Massachusetts is constitutionally amendable only as therein provided." Opinion of
the Justices, 6 Cush. 573. It should be noticed that our
judges interpreted the word "amendment" as including revision and the substitution of a new constitution, which, they
said, could only differ from the existing one "in superstructure and detail" and would be a new constitution only in
name. We are convinced that they were mistaken in this
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view and that there is a real distinction between "an amendment or amendments", as used in constitutions, and a revision or a new constitution, though it may be difficult in some
cases to draw a clear line of demarcation between them. A
careful consideration of the brief opinion written by Chief
Justice Shaw convinces us that he had this distinction very
clearly and definitely in mind and that he very carefully refrained from expressing any opinion upon the question
whether the provision which was in the existing constitution
of his state and which was substantially like our own Article
X I I I prohibited the legislature from calling a constitutional
convention or submitting to the people the matter of calling
such a convention, for the purpose of revising the constitution or drafting a new one. In fact no such question was
submitted to the judges of his court.
The second question which the Massachusetts judges were
asked to answer and which they answered first was as follows : "Can any specific and particular amendment or amendments to the Constitution be made in any other manner than
that prescribed in the ninth article of the amendments adopted in 1820?" The answer which they gave to this question
was "that, under and pursuant to the existing
Constitution,
there is no authority given by any reasonable construction
or necessary implication, by which any specific and particular amendment or amendments of the Constitution can be
made, in any other manner than that prescribed in the ninth
article of the amendments adopted in 1820." This was a perfectly correct answer, but it gave no support to the opinion
of our judges in 1883.
Presumably what our judges were relying upon, and the
only part of the Massachusetts opinion which they, even upon
hasty reading, might have construed as supporting their view
was the next sentence of that opinion, as follows: "Considering that previous to 1820 no mode was provided by the Con-
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stitution for its own amendment, that no other power for that
purpose, than in the mode alluded to, is anywhere given in
the Constitution, by implication or otherwise, and that the
mode thereby provided appears manifestly to have been carefully considered, and the power of altering the constitution
thereby conferred to have been cautiously restrained and
guarded, we think a strong implication arises against the
existence of any other power, under the Constitution, for the
same purposes." (Italics ours)
In view of the fact that in the immediately preceding sentence the judges were clearly discussing only "any specific
and particular amendment or amendments" it is reasonable
to infer that the judges in the latter sentence were still considering only such amendment or amendments, "for the same
purpose" meaning "for the purpose of making any specific
and particular amendment or amendments". This is the only
construction of their language which would make it responsive to the question which they were answering. But, be that
as it may, the words italicized by us in the two quotations
show clearly that the judges were only dealing with the matter of powers recognized as existing, by the constitution. That
they were only dealing with that matter is also made perfectly clear by the very beginning of their opinion, in which they
say: "The court do not understand that it was the intention
of the House of Representatives to request their opinion upon
the natural right of the people in cases of great emergency,
or upon the obvious failure of their existing Constitution to
accomplish the objects for which it was designed, to provide
for the amendment or alteration of their fundamental laws;
nor what would be the effect of any change and alteration
of their Constitution, made under such circumstances and
sanctioned by the assent of the people. Such a view of the
subject would involve the general question of natural rights,
and the inherent and fundamental principles upon which civil
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society is founded, rather than any question upon the nature,
construction, or operation of the existing Constitution of the
Commonwealth, and the laws made under it. We presume,
therefore, that the opinion requested applies to the existing
Constitution and laws of the Commonwealth, and the rights
and powers derived from and under them. Considering the
questions in this light, we are of opinion," etc. In this connection it should be kept in mind that the Massachusetts constitution under which these judges were then sitting contained an express assertion of the right of the people "to institute government; and to reform, alter or totally change
the same, when their protection, safety, prosperity and happiness require it." It is strange that the judges did not quote
this language of the constitution instead of describing the
right of the people as a natural right exercisable "in cases
of great emergency, or upon the obvious failure of their existing constitution to accomplish the objects for which it was
designed." However, they nowhere suggest t h a t the exercise
of this right would be revolutionary, if carried out by the
usual and normal convention method with the concurrence
of the legislature as the natural agency of the people for facilitating the exercise of that power.
In view of what we have said above as to the Massachusetts
opinion and of the fact that the constitution which then existed in that state did not contain any such clause as section
10 of Article IV of our constitution, we are fully convinced
that the Massachusetts opinion does not support in the slightest degree the opinion of our judges.
Our views, above stated, as to the true meaning and effect
of the Massachusetts opinion is in accordance with the views
of all the text writers who to our knowledge have discussed
it. Judge Jameson in "Constitutional Conventions", § 574,
says with reference to the opinion of our judges: "As to the
weight to be accorded this opinion, we will only now observe,
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that so f a r as it is based upon t h a t of the Massachusetts
judges, it is wholly without force, because the two cases are
very dissimilar in their facts, insomuch that, while it is possible to approve the opinion of the Massachusetts judges, it
does not follow, according to the principles propounded in it,
that that of the Rhode Island judges is to be approved. In
the Massachusetts case, where the Constitution had provided
a mode in which 'specific and particular amendments' might
be made through the agency of the legislature, the question
put to the judges was whether 'any specific and particular
amendment or amendments' could be made in any other manner than that provided in the Constitution. To this question
the answer ought, according to the principles announced by
both courts, to have been in the negative, since it inquired
as to the lawfulness of doing the same thing in a different
way from that prescribed by the Constitution. But that
opinion could not properly be cited as authority in the Rhode
Island case, where the question was whether, if a Convention
were called 'to f r a m e a new Constitution of the State*, and it
were adopted by the people, it would be valid, the existing
Constitution having provided a mode in which amendments
thereof might be made, but not having authorized the call of
a Convention? Here, as we shall see in a subsequent section,
the proposition was to do a different thing, t h a t is, to frame
a new Constitution, in a different way, and therefore according to all authorities the maxim could have no application:
in other words, because the people could not do the same
thing in a different way, it does not follow t h a t they could
not do a different thing in a different way."
Holcombe, on "State Government in the United States",
at page 97 of the revised edition, also says with reference to
the opinion of our judges: " I t was contended that there was
precedent for this opinion in an earlier opinion of the supreme court of Massachusetts. A careful study of the opin-
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ion of the Massachusetts court, however, shows that its opinion related to another matter. In no state has the opinion
of the Rhode Island court been followed." To the same general effect are Dodd on "The Revision and Amendment of
State Constitutions", p. 45, and Hoar on "Constitutional Conventions", pp. 46, 47.
The legislature of Massachusetts in 1852, when no emergency existed, submitted to the voters the question of holding
a constitutional convention, the question was answered affirmatively; and the convention was held in 1853. Our views
as to the Massachusetts opinion are in accord with the views
and actions of the members of that convention, which sat under the sanction of the legislature and the people to revise
the very same constitution involved in that opinion. Marcus
Morton, one of the four judges who gave the opinion, sat as
a delegate in that convention, as did also Joel Parker, a former Chief Justice of New Hampshire, and both expressed the
opinion that the convention was legal. That view seems to
have been universally accepted. See Jameson, supra, § 574a.
This convention was not mentioned by our judges in their
opinion nor were any of a number of other conventions which
had been held under constitutions that contained provisions
for their amendment by the method of legislative proposal
and no provisions for constitutional conventions. They failed
also to cite a number of previous cases in other states which
supported the legality of conventions similarly held. Besides
the Massachusetts and New York conventions above discussed, conventions were held before 1883 in the following
states, which at the time had constitutions containing provisions for amendments in the legislative proposal mode, but
none with regard to conventions: Arkansas, 1874; Louisiana,
1852,1879; Missouri, 1845,1861, and 1865; New Jersey, 1844;
Pennsylvania, 1872; Tennessee, 1870; Texas, 1875; See Jameson, 210, § 219, note 1; 560, § 537a, note 2; 601, § 570 and
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note 1; and Appendix B., pp. 643-655. So f a r as we have been
able to ascertain, the validity of any of these conventions has
never been questioned by any text writer or in any cases except a few in which it has been sustained. Many other conventions have been held since 1883 under similar conditions.
These were all recognized as valid and some of them have
been judicially sustained, as will be shown infra.
Briefs submitted to us in support of the opinion of our
judges in 1883 cite two Rhode Island cases as supporting
their position. One of these cases is State vs. Kane 15 R. I.
395, (1886), decided by the same judges except that Judge
Wilbur had replaced Judge Carpenter. A t that time the fifth
amendment to our constitution provided: "The manufacture
and sale of intoxicating liquors to be used as a beverage shall
be prohibited. The general assembly shall provide by law
for carrying this article into effect." Parenthetically, it
should be noticed how closely the language of the second of
the two sentences quoted parallels the language of the second
sentence of section 1 of Article I V of our constitution, "The
general assembly shall pass all laws necessary to carry this
constitution into effect." I t is obvious that in the amendment
the sentence means t h a t the general assembly shall pass all
laws necessary at any time or from time to time to enforce
the amendment; and this supports the view, set forth near
the beginning of this present opinion, t h a t the corresponding
sentence in Article IV should be interpreted in the same way.
The statute involved in the case prohibited the sale of intoxicating liquors for beverage purposes and for certain other
purposes. The defendant argued t h a t the inclusion in the
prohibitory statute of the sale of intoxicating liquors for
these other purposes made the statute repugnant to the
amendment, which only required the general assembly to prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquors for beverage purposes.
With reference to this argument the court, at page 397, says:
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"The defendant's argument rests upon the legal maxim, Expressio unius est exclusio alterius, which, literally translated,
signifies, the expression of one is the exclusion of the other.
The maxim is often applied in construing written instruments, particularly grants, to narrow their scope to what is
expressed in them, by the exclusion of what, but for the expression, would be implied. Thus, if a lot, with no access
to it save over the grantor's land, be conveyed with the express grant of a particular way, any way which might otherwise be implied will be excluded." This language certainly
does not support the advisory opinion of 1883.
A little farther along on the same page the court, in showing that the maxim did not apply to the case, said: "We can
see nothing in the first clause of the fifth amendment which
warrants such an implication. The second clause is a command to the General Assembly to provide by law for carrying the first clause into effect. Of course, if the General Assembly had previously had no power to legislate on the subject, this command would confer by implication the power
required for its own execution. But the General Assembly
had power, before the amendment, not only to prohibit the
sale of intoxicating liquors as a beverage, but also to restrict
and regulate their sale for other purposes. The two powers,
if they may be called two, are not inconsistent. Why, then,
should an express command to exercise the one be tantamount
to an abrogation of the other? We see no reason why it
should. This view is not in conflict with the opinion of the
judges In Re The Constitutional Convention, 14 R. I. 649.
There was in that matter no command to the General Assembly to prohibit the doing of a thing for a particular purpose,
but a command to the General Assembly to proceed in a particular manner in amending the Constitution, if it proceeded
at all. The distinction is this: That it is entirely feasible
to prohibit the doing of a thing for one purpose, and a t the
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same time to prohibit or restrict, or to refrain from prohibiting or restricting, the doing of it for other purposes; whereas
it is impossible to make an amendment to the Constitution
in the manner prescribed, and at the same time to make it in
a different manner. Our conclusion is that the amendment
has no effect beyond what is expressed and what may be implied to carry out what is expressed in it, and consequently
that the General Assembly still has all the powers, not inconsistent with the amendment so construed, which it previously had." The court in this quotation correctly states a
limitation to the proper application of the maxim, saying in
substance, that a power which would otherwise exist in a
legislature to do one thing is not taken away by a constitutional command to exercise in a certain way another power
to do a different thing, the two powers not being inconsistent
with each other. But in our judgment it fails utterly in its
labored efforts to reconcile its advisory opinion of three years
before with this statement of the limitation to the proper application of the maxim. In trying to do this it first begs the
whole question in saying that in the matter previously before
it there was "a command to the General Assembly to proceed
in a particular manner in amending the Constitution, if it
proceeded at all," whereas in fact Article X I I I only permitted the general assembly to propose to the people an amendment to the constitution and then commanded it to follow a
certain procedure in doing this, if the general assembly chose
to initiate a constitutional change in that way; and the general assembly admittedly had another power to do a different
thing, (namely, to initiate proceedings for the holding of a
convention), which would exist otherwise, i.e., unless prohibited by the constitution: and the two powers are entirely
consistent with each other. To our minds it is clearly beside
the point to say, as the court does, that "it is impossible to
make an amendment to the Constitution in the manner pre-
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scribed and at the same time to make it in a different manner." We cannot see that "at the same time" has anything
to do with the case, and even at the same time the general assembly could consistently pass a resolution for proposing a
special amendment to be submitted to the people and pass an
act or resolution with regard to a convention to consider a
general revision of the constitution.
In our judgment the opinion in State vs. Kane,
supra,
greatly lessened rather than increased the weight to be given
to the advisory opinion, by exposing the fallaciousness of the
reasoning in the earlier opinion.
Higgins vs. Tax Assessors of Pawtucket, 27 R. I. 401,
(1905), is also cited in the same brief in support of the advisory opinion, but in our judgment the opinion in t h a t case
also lessened rather than increased the weight to be given to
the advisory opinion. Section 1 of Article X I I of amendments to the constitution, adopted in 1903, provides, among
other things, that the supreme court "shall have power to
issue prerogative writs" and that "the inferior courts shall
have such jurisdiction as may, from time to time, be prescribed by law." The question was whether, under the maxim
above referred to, the provision granting to the supreme court
jurisdiction to issue prerogative writs operated by implication to withhold this jurisdiction from the inferior courts.
The court answered the question in the negative, rightly holding that the maxim was not applicable to the case. In support of this holding it quoted with approval the following
from the opinion in Delafield vs. State of Illinois, 2 Hill, 159
at 167: "As a grant of jurisdiction is not in its own nature
exclusive, it can only be made so either by express words or
by necessary implication." To us this language seems just
as applicable to a constitutional provision vesting in a legislature a permissive power, with only the method of its exercise made mandatory.
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Yet the court in the Higgins case says: "The maxim is undoubtedly a sound rule of construction in cases where it is
applicable. Thus it was invoked by the justices of this court
in their opinion given to the senate, In Re The Constitutional
Convention, 14 R. I. 649, which is cited by the respondent.
There it was held that the specified method of amending the
constitution was the only lawful method; and it is difficult
to imagine a reason for selecting one method out of several
possible ones if all the others were still to remain legal and
available." This is not convincing. At the time when the
constitution was adopted there were only two methods of
changing a constitution which were recognized as possible,
one the convention method with legislative concurrence and
ratification by the people, and the other the legislative proposal method with ratification by the people. The former of
these was recognized as legal unless forbidden by the constitution, while the latter was regarded as legal only when expressly authorized by the constitution. Therefore, if the
makers of our constitution wished to make available the simpler and cheaper legislative proposal method, as an additional one, suitable for specific amendments, we do not find
it "difficult to imagine a reason" for putting in a special provision for t h a t method without putting in any express and
unnecessary provision for the convention method, which
alone is suitable for a general revision.
Many cases outside of Rhode Island have been cited for
and against the advisory opinion of our judges. All the most
important of these will now be discussed.
Wells vs. Bain, 75 Pa. St. 39, (1874), was decided under
the constitution of 1838, which contained a provision like our
Article X I I I and no provision for a convention. The "Declaration of Rights" affirmed the "inalienable and indefeasible
right of the people to alter, reform, or abolish their government in such manner as they may think proper." Yet a con-
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vention was called in 1873, pursuant to a legislative act,
which was passed after a favorable vote of the people; and
the new constitution framed and proposed by the convention
was afterwards adopted by the people and went into operation. The act which called the convention provided that "the
election to decide for or against the adoption of the new constitution or specific amendments shall be conducted as the
general elections are now by law conducted." The convention passed an ordinance for submitting the new constitution
to the people, which provided for a different manner of holding the election. The suit was brought to enjoin the holding
of the election in Philadelphia in this manner.
The court held that the injunction should be issued on the
ground that the act was valid and controlled the manner of
holding the election and that any other manner would be
revolutionary in its nature. It discussed fully the whole matter of changing the constitution by the convention method
and approved it as a proper method of making effectual the
right of the people set forth in the declaration of rights. The
court said at page 47: "The words 'in such manner as they
may think proper,' in the declaration of rights, embrace but
three known recognized modes by which the whole people,
the state, can give their consent to an alteration of an existing lawful frame of government, viz.:
"1. The mode provided in the existing constitution.
"2. A law, as the instrumental process of raising the
body for revision and conveying to it the powers of
the people.
"3. A revolution.
"The first two are peaceful means through which the consent of the people to alteration is obtained, and by which the
existing government consents to be displaced without revolution. The government gives its consent, either by pursuing
the mode provided in the constitution, or by passing a law
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to call a convention. If consent be not so given by the existing government the remedy of the people is in the third mode
—revolution.
"When a law becomes the instrumental process of amendment, it is not because the legislature possesses any inherent
power to change the existing constitution through a convention, but because it is the only means through which an authorized consent of the whole people, the entire state, can be
lawfully obtained in a state of peace. Irregular action, whereby a certain number of the people assume to act for the whole,
is evidently revolutionary." This applies fully to our own
situation, except that, as set forth in this opinion, supra, our
constitution by section 10 of Article IV clearly authorized
the general assembly to exercise the power, which it had frequently exercised previously, to provide for the calling of a
constitutional convention. We do not see how this approval
by the supreme court of Pennsylvania of the convention
method of changing the constitution, although the constitution only provided for the legislative proposal method, can
properly be called a dictum, since the court gave this approval as its reason for granting the injunction and not the
reason that the convention was an illegal and revolutionary
body. Nor do we see how the opinion in that case can be reconciled with that of our judges by reason of the different language of the declarations of rights in the two constitutions,
since, if the Pennsylvania constitution, by providing only for
the method of legislative proposal, had prohibited the convention method of changing the constitution, the latter method
would have been as clearly revolutionary and invalid under
the Pennsylvania declaration of rights as under our own.
The question of the validity of the convention method in
Pennsylvania was squarely raised and decided in the case of
Wood's Appeal, 75 Pa. St. 59, (1874), in which citizens and
taxpayers sought an injunction against the secretary of the
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commonwealth and other officers to prevent them from taking the necessary action for holding an election on the question of the adoption of the new constitution in accordance
with the same "ordinance" of the convention which is mentioned in the above discussion of Wells vs. Bain, supra. The
first ground urged in favor of the injunction was "that the
act was unconstitutional and repugnant to the tenth article
of the constitution," which provided for the making of
amendments to the constitution by the legislative proposal
method, no other method being provided for. The bill prayed
that both that act and the prior act by which the question of
holding a convention had been submitted to the people be declared unconstitutional and void. The case was heard on demurrer to the bill.
It was heard first in the court of common pleas of Allegheny county before Stowe, J., and he sustained the validity
of the acts in question and denied the injunction. In his opinion he says, at page 63, that it is first "necessary to examine
whether there is anything in the constitution, as urged in the
second proposition, which directly or by necessary legal implication takes away such a fundamental right, as we have
suggested, in case it existed, where there is no constitutional
restriction." He then continues as follows: " I t is urged, and
with much apparent force, that because the constitution in
the tenth article 'of amendments' provides a certain and carefully-defined way for amending the fundamental law, the
well-recognized legal maxim ordinarily applied to the construction of deeds and written instruments, as well as acts
of legislation, 'Expressio unius est exclusio alterius,' leads
to the fixed legal presumption that no amendment can, under
the constitution, be made to it, except in the way thus
especially provided.
''Custom and usage have also been allowed to aid in interpreting Acts of Parliament, 'and that exposition,' says Lord
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Coke, 'shall be preferred which is applied by constant use
and experience.' It is by no means certain that the maxim
alluded to should find any favor as a general rule of interpretation of an instrument like a constitution, which must
of a necessity deal in generalities, but at all events, if so applied, it must in all such cases be considered as overcome by
any established or common usage or understanding, indicating a different conclusion." He then sets forth what Jameson said, "with great force", upon this question, cites Barto
vs. Himrod, supra, mentions the opinion of the justices in
Massachusetts and the convention held in that state in 1853,
and mentions twenty-five conventions which had been "called
by the legislatures of the various states, without any special
authorization in their constitutions." He then says, at page
65, "The conclusion that I have drawn from all this is, that
there is underlying our whole system of American government a principle of acknowledged right in the people to
change their constitutions, except where especially prohibited
in a constitution itself, in all cases and at all times, whether
there is a way provided in their constitution or not, by the
interposition of the legislature, and the calling of a convention, as was done in the case in hand." At page 66 he adds:
" I t follows then, that the action of the legislature in authorizing a vote of the people on the question of the amendment
of their constitution, and subsequently by another act authorizing the election of delegates, was a legal exercise of
legislative power, and constitutional, unless something in the
acts themselves is in conflict with some constitutional provision."
On appeal to the supreme court, that court in its opinion
first said: "The change made by the people in their political
institutions, by the adoption of the proposed Constitution
since this decree, forbids an inquiry into the merits of this
case. The question is no longer judicial, but in affirming the
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decree we must not seem to sanction any doctrine in the opinion, dangerous to the liberties of the people. The claim of
absolute sovereignty in the convention, apparently sustained
in the opinion, is of such magnitude and overwhelming importance to the people themselves, it cannot be passed unnoticed."
The supreme court found no fault with the reasoning and
conclusion of the lower court on the matter of the validity
of the convention. Indeed it said at page 72: "The calling
of a convention, and regulating its action by law, is not forbidden in the constitution. It is a conceded manner, through
which the people may exercise the right reserved in the bill
of rights. It falls, therefore, within the protection of the bill
of rights as a very manner in which the people may proceed
to amend their constitution, and delegate the only powers
they intend to confer, and as the means whereby they may,
by limitation, defend themselves against those who are called
in to exercise their powers. The legislature may not confer
powers by law inconsistent with the rights, safety and liberties of the people, because no consent to do this can be implied, but they may pass limitations in favor of the essential
rights of the people. The right of the people to restrain their
delegates by la w cannot be denied, unless the power to call a
convention by law, and the right of self-protection, be also denied. It is, therefore, the right of the people and not of the
legislature to be put by law above the convention, and to require the delegates to submit their work for ratification or
disapproval. * * * To estop them from their right to accept
or reject the work of the convention, there must be an evident
channel pointed out through which their power passed to the
convention to ordain at pleasure a constitution or binding ordinances."
The court then, after considerable discussion of the matter,
says at the end of its opinion: "In conclusion, we find nothing
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in the Bill of Rights, in the vote under Act of 1871, or the authority conferred in the Act of 1872, nothing in the nature
of delegated power, or in the constitution of the convention
itself, which can justify an assumption that a convention so
called, constituted, organized and limited, can take from the
people their sovereign right to ratify or reject a constitution
or ordinance framed by it, or can infuse present life and vigor
into its work before its adoption by the people."
With this last point we are not now concerned, but on the
point now under consideration in this present opinion the
court seems clearly to have approved the opinion of the lower
court.
In Collier vs. Frierson, 24 Ala. 100, (1854), the statement
which is of interest to us is only a dictum, as the question at
issue was whether under the constitutional provision for
amendment by the process of legislative proposal and submission t o the people, an amendment could be validly
adopted without complying fully with such provision, and
the court held t h a t it could not. The declaration of rights
affirmed the right of the people to alter the government in
such manner as they may think expedient and there was no
reference in the constitution to a convention.
The provision in the declaration of rights was perhaps
somewhat more sweeping as to the manner of making alterations than the corresponding one in our constitution, but the
same reasoning, if sound, could have been applied as was applied by our judges, namely, that the people, by providing in
the constitution for its amendment by legislative proposal
and saying nothing about a convention, had limited themselves to the former method as the only manner to be followed
in making constitutional changes. Yet the court in the Alabama case on pages 108 and 109 says: "The constitution can
be amended in but two ways, either by the people, who originally framed it, or in the mode prescribed by the instrument
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itself. * * * We entertain no doubt, that, to change the constitution in any other mode than by a convention, every requisition which is demanded by the instrument itself, must be
observed, and the omission of any one is fatal to the amendment."
This language was quoted at page 543 in the opinion in the
case of Koehler & Lange vs. Hill, 60 la., (1883), in which precisely the same issue was involved as in the Alabama case,
and that issue only, and was decided in the same way. In
one of the two briefs which were submitted to us by counsel
who were delegated by the Rhode Island Bar Association to
prepare and submit briefs on this matter, being the one in
opposition to any power in the general assembly to provide
for calling a convention, that case is cited as supporting the
soundness of the Rhode Island opinion. The constitution of
Iowa as in effect at the time of this opinion, and down at least
to 1917, is shown in "The State Constitutions" by Kettleborough. Section 2 of Article I was as follows: "All political
power is inherent in the people. Government is instituted
for the protection, security, and benefit of the people, and
they have the right, at all times, to alter or reform the same,
whenever the public good may require it." It contained provisions for both methods of changing it, the method by legislative proposal being substantially the same as ours except
that only a majority vote was required for adoption.
It was claimed by those who were trying to sustain the
amendment, the validity of which was in question, t h a t it
had been proposed to the people in accordance with that
method and adopted by vote of the people. The court held
it invalid solely on the ground that according to the legislative records the proposed amendment as acted on by the second legislature and submitted to the people differed in a small
but material respect from the form in which it was passed
by the first legislature.
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We do not find anything in the long opinions in that case
which supports the advisory opinion of our judges. Indeed
the court by its quotations from the opinions in Wells vs.
Bain, supra, and Collier vs. Frierson, supra , seems clearly to
recognize the validity of changes made by the convention
method with the concurrence of the legislature, even under a
constitution which did not provide for that method and did
provide for the legislative proposal method.
Of the other cases outside of Rhode Island which are cited
as supporting the advisory opinion of our judges, State vs.
McBride, 4 Mo. 313, (1836), and State vs. Tufly, 19 Nev. 391,
(1887), simply decide, as did Collier vs. Frierson, supra, and
Koehler & Lange vs. Hill, supra, that, if an amendment is attempted by the legislative proposal method under the constitution, the provisions made by the constitution for that
method must be strictly followed or else the amendment is
not valid even though ratified by a majority vote of the people. These cases do not even contain any dicta in support of
the opinion of our judges, and State vs. Tufly, supra, contains
dicta to the contrary. In the special brief above mentioned
the court in the latter case is quoted as saying: "We conclude
that amendments to the constitution can be made only in the
mode provided by the instrument itself." B u t the Nevada
constitution, which it was referring to, was like the one in
the Iowa case in that it had an express provision for the convention method as well as one for the legislative proposal
method.
Another case similarly cited is State vs. City of New Orleans, 163 La. 777, (1927). It is true that the court said at
page 783: "The Constitution, by section 1, Article X X I , expressly points out when and how amendments to the Constitution may be proposed and considered by the Legislature,
and adopted by a vote of the people, when so submitted. The
manner of proposing and adopting amendments to the Con-
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stitutionas thus provided is exclusive. The Constitution cannot be altered, changed, affected, or amended in any other
manner, unless express and direct permission is given to the
Legislature by the Constitution itself." But the court had
said that the legislative act, which was in question and did
not concern a convention and was declared void, was in its
terms contrary to the constitution; was not a constitutional
amendment; did not purport to be other than an act of the
legislature; and did not pretend to amend any article of the
constitution. The statement above quoted then was not at
all necessary to the decision of the case and all that the court
said as to how the constitution may be altered was the statement above quoted, which was not supported by any reasoning or citation of authority.
It is entitled to very little, if any, weight, especially in view
of what the same court said directly to the contrary in the
earlier case of State vs. American Sugar Refining Co., 137 La.
407, (1915). There the validity and regularity of the constitution of 1913, framed and adopted by the convention method,
were squarely sustained by the court, although all the proceedings involved took place while the constitution of 1898
was in force, which provided for the legislative proposal
method of amending the constitution and contained no reference to constitutional conventions. The court, at page 414,
says that this silence of the organic law on the subject of
conventions "leaves the question of calling such convention
to the representatives of the people in legislative session convened", citing in support of this Cooley on Const. Lim., 7th
ed. 56, now 8th ed. 81. We do not believe that the court in
1927, by the language above quoted from its opinion, intended
to overrule its decision in 1915. It is more likely that it was
not thinking at all about the convention method of altering
the constitution.
Supporters of the opinion of our judges have quoted to us
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another statement from Judge Cooler's work, where, after
speaking of the power of the people "to control and alter at
will the law which they have made", he says at page 85: "But
the will of the people to this end can only be expressed in the
legitimate modes by which such a body politic can act, and
which must either be prescribed by the Constitution whose
revision or amendment is sought, or by an act of the legislative department of the State, which alone would be authorized to speak for the people upon this subject, and to point
out a mode for the expression of their will in the absence of
any provision for amendment or revision contained in the
Constitution itself." This is a perfectly correct statement,
that if a constitution is silent on the subject of its own alteration, the legislature and only the legislature is authorized
to provide an explicit and authentic mode for ascertaining
and effectuating the will of the people on this subject, i.e., by
the convention method.
What is done by those who rely on the above quotation as
supporting the advisory opinion is to construe it as equivalent to the converse of the statement, i.e., as saying that if the
constitution does make any provision with regard to its own
amendment or alteration, the legislature is thus deprived of
the above described authority which otherwise it alone would
have. Judge Cooley does not make that converse statement
anywhere and in thus construing his language those who thus
cite it are making the same mistake as our judges made in
construing Article X I I I of our constitution. In a footnote
to the above quotation he quotes from Jameson's work a long
passage, which ends with this sentence: "Nor is it true * * *
that the giving to the legislature, in a constitution, express
power to recommend specific amendments to that instrument
involves, by implication, the denial to that body of power to
call conventions for a general revision." Moreover, Jameson
in other places in his work clearly and strongly rejects the
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reasoning of our judges and sustains the above-mentioned authority of a legislature, except so far as clearly and definitely
taken away or limited by the constitution, and Cooley, about
a half page further in his discussion of this general subject,
says, with regard to this work by Jameson: "This work is so
complete and satisfactory in its treatment of the general subject as to leave little to be said by anyone who shall afterwards attempt to cover the same."
After discussing other questions as to the changing of constitutions, Jameson at page 601 puts this question, "When
the Constitution makes no provision, then, for amendments,
save in the legislative mode, can a Convention be lawfully
called?" He refers to numerous instances in which conventions have been called under these circumstances and discusses the question on principle. Then he discusses the Massachusetts and Rhode Island advisory opinions and some of
the cases already discussed in this present opinion and the
maxim above referred to and says at page 610: "Obviously,
as we have before remarked, while it may, without absurdity,
be claimed that the maxim operates to prohibit the doing of
the same thing in a different way from that prescribed by
law, it cannot be claimed to prohibit the doing of a different
thing in a different way. Now, it is very clear on the face
of the constitutional provisions authorizing amendments
through the agency of the legislature, as compared with those
authorizing the call of Conventions, that the purpose of the
former is different from that of the latter; in other words,
the thing authorized to be done by the one class of provisions
is a different thing from that authorized to be done by the
other. Thus, the purpose of the legislative mode is to bring
about amendments which are few and simple and independent ; and on the other hand, that of the mode through Conventions is to revise the entire Constitution, with a view to
propose either a new one, or, as the greater includes the less,

to propose specific and particular amendments to it. Where
a few particular amendments only are desired, if the Constitution provides for both modes, the legislative mode should
be employed; but if a revision is or may be desired, the mode
by a Convention only is appropriate, or, as we expect to show,
permissible. * # * To say, then, that the purpose of the two
modes is the same, is to say that a part is equal to, or the
same as, the whole."
At page 615 he says: "Recurring, then, to the question
whether, where a Constitution contains no provision for
amendments save in the legislative mode, a Convention
can be called, the answer must be, both upon principle
and upon precedent, that a Convention can be called,
certainly when a revision of the whole Constitution is
desired, to determine what amendments, if any, are
needed, or, if deemed advisable, to frame a new Constitution. In general, whenever a Convention is called, the
intention is to authorize a revision of the entire Constitution, though, upon its meeting, the result of its labors may
be only to recommend specific amendments. But, where the
legislative mode is adopted, it is never intended to do more
than to formulate certain specific amendments, though, in
one or two cases where constitutional commissions have been
employed, attempts have been made to adapt the legislative
mode to the making of general revisions,—attempts which
have not met -with such success as to justify their repetition."
At page 44 Dodd, in his work above quoted from, says: " I t
has now become the established rule that where the constitution contains no provision for the calling of a convention, but
has no provision expressly confining amendment to a particular method, the legislature may provide by law for the calling of a convention—that is, the enactment of such a law is
within the power of the legislature unless expressly forbidden, and is considered a regular exercise of legislative
power."
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Hoar, pp. 52, 56, 57, takes a somewhat different view from
that of the text writers just quoted as to the basic principles involved, being of the opinion that usually the holding
of a convention is a proceeding over and beyond the constitution rather than under it, but arrives at substantially the
same result.
It should be noticed that there is no need in this state of
deciding between these points of view as to the theory of the
matter, since it is clear, as we have above stated, that the
general assembly has the power under our constitution, by
section 10 of Article IV, to initiate a convention, unless prohibited by the constitution itself. Therefore, since in our
opinion this power is not prohibited, a convention thus initiated, chosen and held would be constitutionally as well as
legally held.
Holcombe, supra, in what we believe to be the latest book
which deals with the question (1926), says at page 96: "The
question therefore arises, what is the status of the constitutional convention in those states where its existence is not
expressly recognized in the written constitution? Such states
might logically be divided into two classes, those in which no
express provision for amendment is contained in the written
constitution, and those in w7hich some provision is made for
amendment through the agency of the ordinary legislature."
After discussing the first class and concluding that in them
the legislatures have been authorized by the unwritten law
of their constitutions to start the machinery of constitutional
revision by means of special conventions, he then discusses
the second class of states and the advisory opinions in Massachusetts and Rhode Island. After saying, as quoted supra,
that the former opinion related to another matter and that
in no state has the latter opinion been followed, he adds at
page 97: "On the contrary, the practice of the other eleven
states has been based on the recognition of the right of the
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people through their representatives to provide by law for the
calling of a convention. This right is construed from the fact
that the people undoubtedly possessed the right in the beginning, and have not parted with it by expressly confining
amendment to some other method."
Other cases, not already cited, strongly support this view.
State vs. Dahl, 6 N. D. 81, (1896); State vs. Powell, 77 Miss.
543, (1900), semble; Ellingham vs. Dye, 178 Ind. 336,(1912),
semble; Bennett vs. Jackson, 186 Ind. 533, (1917), semble.
In Ellingham vs. Dye, supra, the court held that a legislature, authorized by the constitution to proceed by the legislative proposal method, could not, under the guise of amending the constitution, frame a new constitution and submit it
to the people for adoption; and the court enjoined the submission of the new constitution. I t discussed thoroughly the
entire matter of changing a constitution by the two methods,
and by way of dictum agreed fully with Jameson's view that,
when only the legislative proposal method was provided for
in the constitution but the convention method was not
clearly forbidden, the legislature could legally initiate the
convention method.
In Bennett vs. Jackson, supra, the court, acting under the
same constitution as in Ellingham vs. Dye, which provided
for the legislative proposal method, but made no provision as
to a constitutional convention, says at page 538: "That the
people of the State have a right to create a new constitution
is conceded by all parties, the only difference of opinion being as to the manner of bringing about that result," i. e., as
to whether the legislature must first obtain at an election the
approval of the people for the holding of a convention.
As a result of our examination of all the cases and text
books on the subject, which are known to us and to which
we have had access, we are convinced that the authority in
support of the advisory opinion of our judges is practically
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negligible and that the weight of authority in opposition to
it is overwhelming. We are convinced that the opinion is
also against sound reasoning and principle. Our conclusion
is that it should be disregarded and that the convention
method would be a proper and legal method of altering our
constitution or framing and adopting a new one, even if the
special provisions of our constitution, to which we called attention near the beginning of this opinion, were not present.
And when we take into consideration the language quoted
from our bill of rights and sections 1 and 10 of Article IV,
that conclusion is in our judgment clear beyond a reasonable
doubt. We therefore answer in the affirmative the first and
primary question propounded to us.
We see no difficulty in subsidiary question (b) if it be understood that the governor is to act only upon instructions
from the general assembly and in no sense to have delegated
to him power which may be exercised only by the general
assembly. To call for the convention is a function of the
general assembly and cannot be left to the discretion of the
governor. The legislature cannot delegate to the governor
the absolute authority to fix the date of the convention election but it may authorize him to fix the date of the election
within some definite period prescribed by the legislature itself. It is now well established that such limited delegation
of legislative power is not within the scope of the rule that
delegated power cannot be delegated. We therefore answer
(b) in the affirmative, subject to our understanding of the
question as here expressed.
This brings us to a consideration of subsidiary question
(c). A constitutional convention is an assembly of the
people themselves acting through their duly elected delegates. The delegates in such an assembly must therefore
come from the people who choose them for this high purpose
and this purpose alone. They cannot be imposed upon the

49
convention by any other authority. Neither the legislature
nor any other department of the government has the power
to select delegates to such a convention. The delegates elected
by and from the people, and only such delegates, may and of
right have either a voice or a vote therein.
It will not, however, be contrary to this principle if the
general assembly provides t h a t the governor or some other
person shall start the convention machinery by calling it to
order- and presiding temporarily until it shall choose its own
president, which is the first business of the convention. Nothing should intervene until this is done as the convention is
not organized as such until it has a directing head. Any
departure from the regular order of business will be promotive of disorder. In this respect the convention should be
vigilant to protect its integrity and its independence. No
one, not a delegate, no matter how exalted his station in the
existing government, can be assured either a voice or a vote
in such a convention unless he comes there with a commission from the people as their delegate, although the convention itself may if it please invite him to address it or give it
counsel, in which case he will be in the convention by invitation and not by virtue of his office.
We therefore answer question (c) in the negative.
Subsidiary question (d) must be answered differently according as the convention is called by the legislature alone
or called by the legislature after an affirmative vote therefor on the part of the people. In the first instance the legislature summons the convention without permitting the people to limit the power of their delegates or to prescribe the
manner in which they shall proceed to perform the task
entrusted to them. Under such circumstances, to permit the
general assembly to set bounds to the authority of the convention is to exalt the legislature, the agent, above its principal, the people. This cannot be. In such a case the gen-
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eral assembly is held to have summoned the people to sit,
by their delegates, in convention untrammeled by rules or
restraints of any kind that will interfere with the performance of its proper functions. This is the prevailing view of
the authority of such conventions and appears to be the logical view.
In the second instance, the legislature summons the convention only after the people have expressed their will to this
effect. If, at the time the question of calling the convention
is submitted to them, the people are informed of the scope of
the convention and the manner in which it is to conduct its
deliberations, and report its results by virtue of the act of
the general assembly specifying such matters, then a convention called in this manner will be limited as therein set forth
and the convention will then be bound to confine itself within
the stated limits of the act of the assembly. The reason for
this is that it is the people, under such circumstances, who
prescribe the conditions in the legislative act by approving
the call for the convention in accordance with the provisions
of such act. The legislature merely proposes the conditions.
It is the vote of the people for the convention that ratifies
them and makes them binding upon the delegates. 6 K. C. L.
§ 18, p. 27. For this reason, in order that the delegates be
so bound, it is necessary for the general assembly to propose
the conditions before the election is held, and to take all necessary steps to bring them to the attention of the people seasonably before the time of voting at the election. This was
done by the general assembly in 1853 when the people twice
voted on such a call in this manner. "We therefore answer
question (d) in the affirmative if the question is submitted
to the people and the act of the general assembly prescribing
rules for organization and conduct of the convention is
brought to their notice before voting on the question; otherwise our answer is in the negative.

1
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Question (e) must be answered not only in the light of
legislative precedents in this state but also with due regard
to our answer to question ( d ) . It would seem that if the
general assembly calls the convention, then the convention,
itself, may disregard any legislative directions for ratification of its work by the people and prescribe a method of its
own. All the legislative precedents in this state, however,
are in support of the view that the legislature can provide
that the work of the convention shall be submitted to the people for ratification or rejection before going into effect.
Whether it is prescribed by the general assembly or the convention. in either case we think a reference to the people for
their approval or disapproval is a necessary and final step
without which the work of the convention is lacking legality.
It seems to us that the better practice, and the one most
likely to insure a final vote of the people on the convention's
work would be for the general assembly to enact a law for
this purpose. As the legislature under the existing government has the power over the purse strings and exercises the
legislative authority to define offenses and prescribe their
punishment, neither of which powers is inherent in a constitutional convention, it is clear to us that the legislature from
a practical viewpoint is the only body that can order a referendum election and make provision for the necessary appropriations therefor, and prescribe the punishment for offenses
that may be committed thereat. Without this an orderly
election would be difficult, if not impossible. The work of
the conventions of 1824, 1841 and 1842 were submitted to
the people in accordance with acts of the assembly. Following those precedents and for the reasons above stated we
answer the question in the affirmative.
W e now come to the final question ( f ) . If this question
refers only to the matter of making a final count of the votes
and officially reporting the result so that it may be duly reg-

istered and recorded as an authentic act of the people, we
think for the reasons given in answer to question (e) that
such act of the general assembly would be valid. If the
question refers to the power of the general assembly to provide by law that the vote of a majority of the electors voting
thereon shall be sufficient for ratification and adoption, our
opinion, in view of the legislative precedents in this state, is
that it has that power. Whether the exercise of it is subject
to a power in the convention to require a larger majority is
one which is not asked and which in the present state of the
authorities we prefer not to answer. Of course if this question of the necessary majority is submitted to the people,
their decision is final.
We have now given our opinions on all the questions which
appear to have been clearly submitted to us or to be necessarily implied, and so f a r all the judges of the court are in
agreement. But there is a further question which is at
least closely related to the provision covered by subparagraph
(a) and may have been intended to be included therein. This
question is: granting that the general assembly has the general power to legislate with regard to the election by the
people of a constitutional convention, as we have previously
found, is that power subject to the condition that the people
must consent at an election to the holding of such a convention? This has been discussed pro and con in briefs and
arguments submitted to us and we therefore feel that we
should express our opinion upon it.
The exact question whether or not that general power is,
necessarily and as a matter affecting the essence of the power,
restricted by the condition stated, unless the constitution
provides otherwise, has been very little discussed in the
cases or by the text writers. Nearly all of them do not deny
the existence of the general and unlimited power, and discuss
whether the exercise of it is in conformity with general usage
and with sound policy under ordinary circumstances.

We have already seen that the majority of the court in
Bennett vs. Jackson, 186 Ind. 533, supra, stated that the legislature did not have the power to call a convention without
the consent of the people, and decided that it had no such
power when the people within about three years had voted
against the calling of a convention. Their treatment of the
question covered by their statement is of the sketchiest. After
proposing it and saying that the right of the people in the
matter of changing the constitution is supreme, subject, however, to the condition t h a t the legislature must approve, they
say: "How may these—the people and the legislature—get
together on this proposition? If no positive rule is provided
by the fundamental law of the State, then, if a custom has
prevailed for a sufficient length of years so that it is said to
be fully established, that rule of custom must prevail.
" I t seems to be an almost universal custom in all the states
of the Union, where the constitution itself does not provide
for the calling of a constitutional convention, to ascertain
first the will of the people and procure from them a commission to call such a convention, before the legislature proceeds
to do so. The people being the depository of the right to
alter or reform its government, its will and wishes must be
consulted before the legislature can proceed to call a convention. G R. C. L. §17, p. 27; Hoar, Constitutional Conventions, p. 68, (1917). We find our own State, under the custom that has prevailed in other states, submitting to the
people the question as to whether a convention should be
called in the year 1915. (Acts 1913, ch. 304, p. 812.)" That
is all they say on this point.
The statement as to the custom in other states is much too
sweeping and we do not see how the custom in other states, a
very large part of which was after the adoption of the existing Indiana constitution can have the effect of a constitutional provision in that state. It appears elsewhere in the
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opinion that the submission directed in 1913 was the only
one in that state, at least since 1851; and neither of the citations supports in the slightest degree the vital sentence which
the citations follow. On the other hand the dissenting judge
in a long opinion on this one question beginning at page 541
discusses the matter fully. On pages 549 and 550 he cites
many authorities which state that the enactment of a law for
the calling of a convention is within the power of a legislature, unless expressly forbidden, and do not suggest any
other limitation of that power.
At page 552 he says: "Reduced to its last analysis, it is
clear that the only difference between the plan outlined by
the court in its opinion and the plan embodied in the act of
1917 is one of method. The plan recognized by the court may
be more wise, more economical, and more expedient than that
adopted by the legislature, and while such questions should
be considered by the legislature before passing a law, they
have no place here. When a court is engaged in considering
the validity of a law from a constitutional standpoint it has
no ears to hear arguments addressed to questions of wisdom,
economy or expediency." At page 553 he cites twelve instances in which conventions were called by legislative action
alone without a reference to the people, four of them from
Rhode Island, and concludes that as to the method to be
adopted by a legislature "it is controlled only by the existing
constitution, and, so long as it does not violate the express
or implied provisions of that instrument, it may adopt the
method which seems most wise and expedient under existing
conditions."
On pages 554 and 555 he ends as follows and with this,
after most careful consideration, we fully agree: "One f u r t h e r
question remains to be considered. Does the plan of procedure embodied in the act of 1917 conflict with § 1, Art. I, of
the State Constitution, which reserves to the people the inde-
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feasible right to alter and reform their government? Under
the plan adopted, the people have a right, through delegates
elected for that purpose, to frame the constitution which
would contain such alterations and reformations in the form
of government as seemed proper to the delegates and after
the constitution was so framed the people by their vote would
have a right to accept or reject the changes thus offered. To
my mind the plan adopted by the act does not in any way or
to any extent impair or abridge the rights of the people under
this section of the Bill of Rights; but, on the other hand it
provides a means by which the people may exercise their
indefeasible right to alter and reform their government. * * *
I t may be and probably is true that, in view of the existing
war conditions, this is an ill-chosen time to attempt constitutional revision. I t may be true that the plan adopted by the
legislature is unwise, in t h a t it may occasion a useless expenditure of the people's money, if it should be ascertained
in the end that a new constitution is not desired, when that
fact could have been learned in a manner much less expensive. If the question to be decided involved the wisdom of
the plan adopted or its expediency, my conclusion might be
against it on those grounds, but, as such considerations can
have no place in determining the validity of the plan from a
constitutional standpoint, I am forced to the conclusion that
the plan for holding a constitutional convention embodied in
the act of 1917 is unobjectionable when viewed from that
standpoint." We may properly add to this that the question
of the advisability of spending the money of a state for any
purpose is peculiarly one for the legislature to decide, except
so f a r as it may be controlled by some clear provision in the
constitution.
I t is easy to understand how the majority of the court in
this Indiana case felt toward the legislative act which called
a convention so soon after the people by a very large majority
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had refused to approve a call. But in our judgment they
were wrong in allowing their natural indignation to lead
them to lay down the rule of law which they did.
The main ground which they gave for their statement was
that "The people being the repository of the right to alter or
reform its government, its will and wishes must be consulted
before the legislature can proceed to call a convention." This
seems to us clearly a non sequitur, as the people do all the
altering and reforming of their government, if they first,
through delegates chosen by them for t h a t purpose, frame
and provisionally decide upon the changes to be made, if any,
and then, at an election, finally decide to make them. I t is
settled that the people alone cannot, without revolutionary
action, call a constitutional convention, unless the constitution provides the necessary machinery for that purpose, but
the legislature must take the first step in starting the process of having the constitution re-examined, (which is the
primary meaning of "revised"), by a convention chosen by
the people, to see if in the sound judgment of the convention
it ought to be altered and, if so, how. This is so because,
unless the constitution furnishes the necessary machinery for
electing the delegates and so forth, the legislature alone can
provide it.
If, after the legislature has decided that such a convention
ought to be called for the purpose stated, it is essential to the
legality of the call that the people vote in favor of it at an
election, then that makes necessary four popular elections,
before their power of alteration can be effective. That is, they
must first elect a legislature that will pass the necessary legislation ; second, they must vote in favor of a convention;
third, they must elect delegates to a convention t h a t a f t e r
examining the constitution will frame and submit to the
people the alteration desired; and finally at a fourth election
the people must vote in favor of the alteration. The first,

third and fourth of these elections are obviously necessary for
legally altering the constitution by the convention method;
and obviously again, the adoption by the people of the alteration recommended by the convention ratifies all that has
gone before, according to all the authorities on the subject.
The requirement of the second election clearly impedes
rather than facilitates the exercise by the people of their
power to control their governmental institutions.
I t may perhaps be wiser t h a t it be thus impeded, so as to
make constitutional changes harder and slower to make, just
as it may be argued t h a t it would be wiser to make a threefifths instead of a majority vote necessary for a legal alteration of the constitution, or to require, for adoption of any
change, majority votes in two elections two years apart. But
each of these ways of impeding the people in the exercise of
their fundamental power is a matter of policy and the adoption of neither of them is necessary or even called for in
order to make effective the exercise of that power. If the
people deem it wise thus to impede the exercise of their own
power, they may put a suitable provision into the constitution for t h a t purpose. Or if the legislature deem it wise, it
can decline to call a convention unless the people at an election vote in favor of one. But in our judgment a court is
going entirely outside of its proper functions to require that
such an election be held, unless the constitution clearly requires it.
The opinion in State vs. Dahl, supra, is sometimes cited as
supporting the view t h a t a legislature cannot legally call a
convention without obtaining the consent of the people, but
a careful examination of the opinion shows that the rule
there stated is one purely of policy and not of law. The question at issue was whether the legislature had any power to
submit the question to the people and the court holds that
it had such power and says t h a t in fact such submission is
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desirable. At page 85, it says: "Nor can it be said that it is
an empty form to leave to popular vote the grave question
whether the people shall assemble in convention, and revise
their fundamental law."
We do not deny that this is a proper and may be a desirable method of procedure, but that is f a r from a statement
that it is a legally necessary method. No such statement is
made in the opinion, nor is one to be implied. In fact the
court says at page 86, that "while the power resides in the
legislature, and that body only, to call a constitutional convention, it is obvious that it * * * should not * * * burden
the people with the necessary expense of such a movement,
without first submitting the question to them." This is
clearly a dictum relating not to the power of the legislature,
which is admitted, but only to what the court considers to
be sound policy in exercising it. The expense is all that the
court emphasizes, and as stated, supra, this is always a matter for a legislature to pass upon, except so f a r as restricted
by the constitution.
The court refers to and quotes from a message sent in 1820
by the Council of Revision of New York to the legislature
returning with its disapproval a bill which called a constitutional convention without referring the matter to the people.
The council stated its objections to be that it was "the most
wise and safe course and most accordant with the performance of the great trust committed to the representative powers under the constitution" to submit to the people the question of holding a convention. This is clearly a matter of
policy and not of power.
To be sure the message says that it "may well be doubted"
whether it belongs to the ordinary legislature to call a constitutional convention without first obtaining permission
from the people. But it did not discuss or decide this question of power and indeed it had no right to do so, as it was
not a court, but only a special body vested with a veto power
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over such legislation, and it proceeded on the ground of what
it considered sound policy.
We are aware of no other case which appears, even by way
of dictum, to deny the power of the legislature, unless forbidden by the constitution, to call a convention without obtaining the consent of the people; nor have we found any text
books on the general subject which deny that power, if not
prohibited, though Hoar, at page 61, says that "there is
some doubt as to whether the legislature can legally call a
convention without obtaining the popular permission." There
are many references to the general practice of submitting the
matter to the people and to the fact that the great majority
of state constitutions now require such a submission. But
these considerations go to the point of policy and not to that
of power and if there is any implication to be drawn from the
latter of these facts, it is rather that the framers of these
constitutions felt that it was necessary to require such submission in order to take away the power which the legislature would otherwise have to call a convention without obtaining the consent of the people.
On the other hand a good many conventions have been
held which were called by the legislatures without the consent of the people and the results of whose work have been
adopted by the people. We are not aware that the legitimacy of the constitutional changes thus made has ever been
questioned. Jameson says at page 211: " I t must be laid
down as among the established prerogatives of our General
Assemblies, that, the Constitution being silent, whenever
they deem it expedient, they may call Conventions to revise
the fundamental law." Dodd says at page 46: "Then, too,
when no provision is contained in a state constitution regarding the calling of a convention, it would seem to be within
the discretion of the legislature as to whether the question
should be submitted to the people." And as already quoted,
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supra, the court in State vs. American Sugar Refining Co.,
137 La. 407, at 414, says that the silence of the organic law on
the subject of conventions "leaves the question of calling such
convention to the representatives of the people in legislative
session convened." What the feeling or the general practice
in this matter may have become since the adoption of a constitution may very properly influence the discretion of the
legislature in exercising its power under that constitution,
but it seems to us utterly irrelevant as to the extent of the
power, which must depend upon what the constitution meant
when it was adopted.
It is our conclusion, then, that outside of Rhode Island, in
states in which a submission to the people of the question
of calling a convention is not required by their constitutions,
the legislatures have the power in their discretion to call
conventions without such submission.
The reasons which have led us to this conclusion apply in
full force in this state. Moreover, there are facts peculiar
to this state which to our minds make the same conclusion
here clear and inevitable.
In 1821 and again in 1822 the general assembly submitted
to the electors, known as the "freemen", a request to express
their "opinions" as to the "expediency" of calling a constitutional convention, evidently as an aid to the general assembly
in deciding the question of whether or not to issue such a call.
In neither case were the freemen given any power to decide
that question. In each case the freemen returned a large
majority of opinions against the expediency of such a call,
there being in the latter case 843 for and 1804 against. Yet
in 1824, less than two years after this second unfavorable
reply from the freemen, the general assembly, without again
consulting them, issued a call for a constitutional convention
by requesting the freemen to choose delegates to such a convention, any constitution framed by the convention to be sub-
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mitted to the freemen for ratification. The freemen chose
delegates accordingly and the convention was held. It framed
and submitted a constitution, which was rejected by the
freemen.
Again in 1834 the general assembly issued a similar call,
without consulting the freemen, and a convention was chosen
and held, but no constitution was framed. In 1841 and again
in 1842 similar calls were similarly issued, conventions were
chosen and held, the constitution framed by the former convention being rejected and the one framed by the latter, our
present constitution, being ratified.
In all these proceedings the general assembly kept in itself
and exercised the power to decide whether or not to call a
convention and whether or not, before doing so, to obtain the
opinions of the voters as to its "expediency". Then, too, all
of these proceedings must have been well known to the framers of our present constitution and the later of them, at
least, must have been well known to those who voted for its
ratification.
The next fact to be considered is that, as above stated, our
constitution, as framed and ratified, provided and still provides, in section 10 of Article IV, that "The General Assembly shall continue to exercise the powers they have heretofore exercised, unless prohibited in this constitution." This
does not say "the legislative powers" but "the powers", and
according to the clearly correct reasoning of Chief Justice
Ames in the unanimous opinion of this court in Taylor vs.
Place, supra, as to the vesting of "the judicial power in the
courts" by section 1 of Article X, "the powers" means all the
powers. Section 10 of Article IV then clearly continued in
the general assembly the power to call upon the people to
elect a constitutional convention, whenever it deemed it expedient to do so, without submitting to the people the question of such call, unless the exercise of this power was "prohibited" by the constitution.
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As we have previously said in this opinion, this power cannot be held to be prohibited by anything short of an express
prohibition or language which is equivalent to an express
prohibition. We have stated supra that in our judgment Article X I I I is not such a prohibition. The only other provision in our constitution on which any argument against this
broad power can conceivably be based is the language above
quoted from section 1 of Article I that "the basis of our
political systems is the right of the people to make and alter
their constitutions of government", the "paramount obligation" of which "in all legislative, judicial, and executive proceedings" we freely admit. But as we have previously shown
herein, we cannot see that the submission by a legislature to
the people of the preliminary question of whether a convention should be held is any necessary part of the exercise by
the people of their fundamental right to make and alter their
constitutions. Indeed we cannot see that it is any part at all
of the making or altering of a constitution by the convention method. That is done by the free choice by the people of
delegates to a convention, under legislative sanction, the
framing by the convention of a new constitution or of the
alteration to be made of an existing one, and the ratification
by the people of the proposed constitution or alteration.
As above stated, it is clear to our minds that the requiring
of any extra election by the people which is not a direct and
necessary part of the making or altering of a constitution
impedes rather than facilitates the exercise by the people of
their fundamental right. Indeed so many elections might be
required in a constitution for its alteration as to make any
such alteration very difficult and to constitute a very serious
impairment of the people's fundamental right, Moreover,
those who do not assert the unrestricted power of a legislature to call a convention recognize that at any rate the calling of a convention, which has not previously been approved
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by the people, is ratified if the people adopt the result of the
convention's work. This clearly shows that there is really no
inconsistency between the calling of a convention without
first obtaining the express consent of the people and the
fundamental right of the people to make and alter their
constitutions.
It should also be kept in mind that, although prior to our
present constitution there may have been in this state no
constitutional declaration of the fundamental right of the
people to make and alter their governmental institutions, yet
that right was everywhere recognized after the Declaration
of Independence, even in the states whose constitutions did
not contain any such declaration. I t was no doubt recognized in this state, and yet apparently no one asserted that
it was inconsistent with that right of the people for the
general assembly to call a constitutional convention without
obtaining the consent of the people.
We cannot see that the fact that the general assembly in
1853 submitted to the people the question of the holding of
a convention is of any importance whatever. As the general
assembly could perfectly well have the discretionary power
to call a convention either with or without the consent of the
people, the fact that it chose to ask the consent of the people
at that time does not at all tend to prove that it could not
have validly called a convention without such consent if it
had chosen to do so.
In view of all these considerations we cannot see that there
is any such inconsistency between the fundamental right of
the people to make and alter their constitutions, as set forth
in our bill of rights, and the previously many times exercised power of our general assembly to call a convention,
without submitting the question to the people, as would
justify us in saying that that power of the general assembly
is prohibited by our bill of rights. There is certainly no ex-
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press prohibition and it is clear to us that there is nothing
which is substantially equivalent to an express prohibition.
It is an entirely different case from that before this court in
Taylor vs. Place, supra, in which it was rightly held that, in
view of other provisions in the constitution, the language of
section 1 of Article X clearly meant that all the judicial
power was vested in the courts and that this was equivalent
to an express prohibition of the exercise of any of that power
by the general assembly.
Our opinion then is that the general assembly clearly has
the power to pass a law calling a constitutional convention
without obtaining the approval of the people for the calling
of such convention, and that whether the exercise of that
power at any particular time is advisable or proper is for the
general assembly alone to decide, giving such weight as it
may deem proper to the existing circumstances, to the usual
but by no means universal custom of legislatures to ask such
consent and to the fact that the great majority of constitutions now require it.
EDMUND W .

FLYNN

WILLIAM W .
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Finding myself unable to agree in one respect with the
views expressed in the opinion of the majority of the judges
in response to the questions asked us, I deem it my duty to
set out my position in connection therewith.
I am in general accord with the conclusion reached by the
majority of the judges, and for the reasons expressed in their
opinion, that a constitutional convention can be called under
the constitution by the general assembly to revise that instrument. This is in answer to the first question asked which is
marked (a) which reads as follows:
"Would it be a valid exercise of the legislative power if the
General Assembly should provide by law,
(a) for a convention to be called to revise or amend the
constitution of the state."
In one particular, however, I am unable to concur with
the holding of the majority opinion, and that relates to the
necessity of the submission to the people by the general assembly of the question of the calling of a constitutional convention before the general assembly actually proceeds to
make the call.
Granting that a constitutional convention to frame a new
constitution or generally revise the existing instrument may
properly be held under the present constitution, it seems
well settled that the legislature is the proper organ or body
to initiate proceedings to bring such a convention into existence. The authorities are not uniform in construing the
nature of the power employed in this connection. I t would
not seem to be the ordinary legislative power in its narrower sense. But whatever its nature, whether inherently legislative, or as being in the legislature as the agent of the sovereign people and the most suitable body to act as representing
them, it is clear that the power exists in some form, and a
discussion at length as to its scope would not be profitable.
A serious question is raised, however, as to what is the
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legitimate exercise of this power by the legislature in starting proceedings looking toward the calling of a constitutional convention.
There are two views. One is that the legislature has the
power to call a constitutional convention without first submitting to the sovereign people the question as to whether
they wish such a convention to be held; the other is t h a t the
power of the legislature in the first instance is limited to
ascertaining from the people their desires in connection with
the holding of a constitutional convention.
Very respectable authority is found supporting both positions. Those arguing for the first contention or the broad
power claim that such power is inherent in the legislature,
and that it is entirely a matter of policy or the exercise of a
sound discretion as to whether the question should first be
submitted to the people. Those taking the second position
urge that the submission of the question to the people is a
necessary prerequisite to the proper exercise of the power by
the legislature.
After giving this question careful consideration, I have
come to the conclusion that the reasoning which supports the
second of the above views, viz.: that requiring submission to
the people by the legislature of the question of calling a constitutional convention in order to get their approval before
making the actual call, is the sounder, the more correct, and
the more in accord with modern trends and developments in
constitution making.
On this general proposition, without considering at this
time conditions peculiar to this state, reference may be had
to a few citations of authority. As early as 1820, Chancellor
Kent of New York, in writing a report for the Council of
Revision of that state, to whom had been submitted an act
passed by both houses of the New York Legislature in connection with the calling of a constitutional convention, used
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the following language: " I t is worthy, therefore, of great
consideration, and may well be doubted, whether it belongs
to the ordinary legislature, chosen only to make laws in pursuance of the provisions of the existing Constitution, to call
a Convention in the first instance, to revise, alter, and perhaps remodel the whole fabric of the government, and before
they have received a legitimate and full expression of the
will of the people that such changes should be made." Jameson, Constitutional Conventions, 670.
There is, in another portion of the report, language which
possibly implies that the question of submission might be
one of policy. I t is submitted, however, that the above quotation indicates that the writer's opinion was clearly against
the exercise of the broad power by the legislature.
In H o a r on Constitutional Conventions at page 68 the
following statement is f o u n d : "Thus convention-calling is not
a regular function of the legislature, and there is a growing
tendency toward the view t h a t the legislature has no power
to call a convention without first obtaining permission from
the people."
Dodd in The Revision and Amendment of State Constitutions at page 51 says: "The practice of obtaining the popular
approval for the calling of a convention may be said to have
become almost the settled rule. Thirty-two state constitutions require such a popular expression of approval, and even
where it has not been expressly required such a popular vote
has been taken in a majority of cases in recent years." At
page seventy-one he f u r t h e r says: "According to what is now
the more usual procedure in the adoption of constitutions,
there are three popular votes connected with the m a t t e r :
(1) The vote of the people authorizing a convention. (2)
The election by the people of delegates to the convention.
(3) The submission to the people for approval of the constitution framed by the convention."
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In the case of State vs. Dahl, 6 N. D. 81, the court at page
85 used the following language: "Nor can it be said that it
is an empty form to leave to popular vote the grave question
whether the people shall assemble in convention, and revise
their fundamental law."
While the decision of the court in this case was finally
based on narrower grounds, nevertheless it seems clear from
the language used in the opinion that the court stands for the
general principle of submission.
In the case of Bennett vs. Jackson, 186 Ind. 533, a comparatively recent authority, the following view is approved
by the court at page 539: "It seems to be an almost universal
custom in all of the states of the Union, where the constitution itself does not provide for the calling of a constitutional
convention, to ascertain first the will of the people and procure from them a commission to call such a convention, before the legislature proceeds to do so. The people being the
repository of the right to alter or reform its government, its
will and wishes must be consulted before the legislature can
proceed to call a convention." In this case there was a dissenting opinion which is approved and discussed at length by
the other members of this court.
Finally, it is noticeable that in the various state constitutions expressly permitting the calling of constitutional conventions (the number of such constitutions being well over
thirty) in all but a very few the provision is contained that
the question be submitted to the people for their approval
before the convention is called. This state of facts reveals
clearly the present trend and development in constitutional
law on this point.
The question is next presented as to whether anything in
our own constitution or our historical background prevents
the application of the general principles above set out to the
issue now before us. It is probable that the language of sec-
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tion 10 of Article IV of our constitution, having in mind our
constitutional history, presents the strongest argument for
the holding t h a t the legislature has the power to call a constitutional convention without first submitting to the people
the question of whether they wish one called. In this connection the conclusion of the majority of the judges is based
to some extent on said section 10 of Article IV. This section
reads as follows: "The general assembly shall continue to
exercise the powers they have heretofore exercised, unless
prohibited in this constitution."
After the Revolution and prior to the taking effect of the
present constitution in 1843, the state was still under the
Royal Charter granted in 1663, slightly modified. This
charter could hardly be termed a constitution, but it represented the fundamental law of the state. Under it the general assembly had extremely wide powers. In the early years
of the nineteenth century t h a t body made use of both methods of calling constitutional conventions. In 1821 and 1822
questions were submitted to the people as to the expediency
of calling a constitutional convention and both times the
vote was in the negative. In 1824, 1834, 1841 and 1842, the
general assembly proceeded to call conventions without first
asking the approval of the people. I t is clear therefore that
prior to 1843 the general assembly, whether rightly or
wrongly, exercised the power of calling constitutional conventions directly.
Apparently, therefore, the next point for consideration is
whether, in the legislative grant given the general assembly
in section 10. Article IV, under the present constitution, this
power was continued on to the general assembly, or whether
its exercise is prohibited by any other part of the constitution.
I t would seem that the only portion of the present constitution which could act as a check, limitation or prohibition
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on any powers granted under Article IV, section 10 in this
connection would be Article I, section 1. This whole section together with its preamble must be read and construed
together. I t is set out fully in the majority opinion. It constitutes a part of the bill of rights in the constitution. By its
terms the sovereign people expressly reserved to themselves,
as a matter of fundamental law, when they voted to accept
the present constitution, the right to make and alter their
constitutions of government. In the preamble it is declared
that the "essential and unquestionable rights and principles
hereinafter mentioned shall be established, maintained, and
preserved, and shall be of paramount obligation in all legislative * * * proceedings."
I t is largely from this general reservation of power that
we find the authority to hold a convention a t all under the
constitution, the latter being otherwise silent on the matter
of calling a convention. The language of section 1, Article I
and its preamble should be broadly construed. The intent is
clear to reserve in the sovereign people all powers in connection with altering and making their fundamental law, except
what is granted to the legislature under Article X I I I relating to amendments. The language and intent of the reservation seems wide enough to require that the sovereign people
be consulted and their favorable opinion obtained before the
legislature proceeds to call a constitutional convention. The
people should be entitled to a participation in all the incidents and steps connected with the proceedings instituted
to set up a constitutional convention, which are included in
the full exercise of the right to make and alter their constitution of government.
In my opinion it does not meet the entire requirements of
section 1, Article I and its preamble, to say that the people
may vote for delegates to a convention, and that such con-
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vention will be obliged to submit its work to the people for
approval or disapproval. Under the express reservation of
rights in section 1, Article I, they are entitled to be consulted
in the beginning as to whether or not they desire a constitutional convention called to alter or revise their constitution.
I t seems reasonable to hold, therefore, that section 1, Article
I and its preamble act as a prohibition to the exercise of any
power by the general assembly under section 10, Article IV
to call a constitutional convention directly without first ascertaining the will of the people.
Section 10, Article IV of the constitution has been discussed by this court several times. One of the first occasions
was in the well known opinion by Ames, C. J . in Taylor vs.
Place, 4 R. I. 324. There it was forcefully held that an affirmative grant in the constitution of the judicial power to
the courts operated as a necessary prohibition on the exercise
of any judicial power by the general assembly under said
section 10, Article IV. This opinion of Taylor vs. Place,
supra, was later referred to in the case of Higgins vs. Tax
Assessors of Pawtucket, 27 R. I. 405, where the court said
"and therefore the affirmative words of the constitution
granting judicial power to the Supreme Court and such other
courts as the General Assembly should establish were construed as taking away such power from the General Assembly."
On the issue now presented to us for consideration, while
perhaps the line of demarcation is not so distinct, nevertheless the same general reasoning would apply. Here instead
of an affirmative grant of the judicial power, as in section 1,
Article X, we have in section 1, Article I, a very clear, positive, and express reservation in the sovereign people of the
right to make and alter their constitutions of government,
which right is to be of paramount obligation in all legisla-
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tive proceedings, and which right, as we have seen, may be
exercised by means of a constitutional convention.
If the former is held to be a necessary prohibition as applied to the exercise of any judicial power passing to the
general assembly under section 10, Article IV, it is difficult to
see why, in the present inquiry, the latter reasonably may not
be construed as a prohibition to the use of any power by the
general assembly in calling a convention without first ascertaining from the people if one is desired.
In the case of the City of Providence vs. Moult on, 52 R. I.
236, the court discusses at length the theory of local selfgovernment in its relation to the powers given the general
assembly under section 10, Article IV. In holding that the
general assembly has very broad powers, the following language is used at page 243: "The above references show t h a t
under the charter the general assembly had unlimited power
and authority restricted only by the constitution of the
United States. Cities and towns had no powers of local
self-government under the charter, and none were reserved
to them by the constitution adopted in 1842." The cases of
City of Newport vs. Horton, 22 R. I. 196 and Horton vs. City
of Newport, 27 R. I. 283, are cited with approval.
However, the situation presented in the Moulton and
Horton cases, supra. and that now being considered seem
plainly distinguishable. It is clear that no powers were reserved to the towns by the present constitution adopted in
1842, whereas in section 1, Article I, there is an unequivocal
reservation of right in the sovereign people to make and alter
their constitutions of government.
If historical precedents are of any value, we find that twice
in 1853 the general assembly submitted to the people the
question of whether a constitutional convention should be
called. This action was ten years after the present constitution went into effect and, while not conclusive, would seem
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to have some value as an example of more or less contemporaneous construction.
Under the present constitution, no general assembly as
yet has ever issued a direct call for a constitutional convention. Possibly the decision of the judges in 1883 may have
had a bearing on this state of facts, but nevertheless the
usage and custom which developed have some force as a legislative precedent. This court said in an Advisory Opinion of
the Justices, 3 R. I. at page 308 (1854), speaking of the exercise of judicial power by the general assembly: "If the practice of the General Assembly, down to the adoption of the
Constitution, had been to exercise such a jurisdiction, and
such practice has been discontinued since, it is fair to presume it was discontinued because inconsistent with that instrument."
I t is hard to perceive why the same argument on the existing facts cannot be made in connection with the exercise of
the power to call constitutional conventions without first
submitting the question to the people to find out their will.
In view of the above considerations, it is my opinion that
the right reserved to the sovereign people in section 1 of
Article I of the constitution operates as a prohibition to the
exercise by the general assembly of the power to call directly
a constitutional convention under section 10 of Article IV of
the constitution, and that there is, therefore, nothing in our
existing constitution which prevents the application of what
seems to be the sounder principle of the law relating to the
calling of constitutional conventions by the legislature.
I therefore answer the question marked (a) in the affirmative, provided that the general assembly has, as a necessary
prerequisite, first submitted to the people for their approval
or disapproval the question of the calling of the convention.
If the sovereign people approve, by a majority of those vot-
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ing, then the general assembly can proceed to make the call,
otherwise not.
If a question should be submitted to the people it would
appears that its form is largely discretionary with the general
assembly. The question might be merely the simple one as
to whether a constitutional convention should be held; or it
might be fuller and broader, setting out in some detail the
type and scope of the convention proposed to be called. If
the latter form of question is made use of, then the general
assembly and the convention would be bound, in case of an
affirmative vote by the people, to the type and scope of convention referred to in the question.
Assuming a convention called after a vote of approval by
the people, then I concur in the answers given in the opinion
of the majority of the judges, and for the reasons set out
therein, to the subsidiary questions marked (b), (c), (d),
(e), ( f ) .
H U G H B . BAKER

